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This article examines policy divergence between the Scottish pro-independence parties in
the  context  of  the  2016  Scottish  Parliament  election.  It  focuses  on  the  main  pro-
independence parties, namely the four pro-independence parties that were able to field
candidates in each of the Scottish regions. Those were the Scottish National Party, the
Scottish  Greens  (which  have  officially  supported  independence  since  20051),  a  new
socialist alliance called RISE, and another socialist party called Solidarity. As can be seen
in the following table, which presents a list of all of the pro-independence candidates in
the 2016 election, the only existing pro-independence party that has been excluded from
the analysis is the newly-created Scottish Libertarian Party, a party which only fielded
four candidates across the whole of Scotland and therefore played an extremely marginal
role (if any at all) in the election campaign.
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Source: Figures compiled by the author and based on the information given on the
websites of each party.
Looking at policy divergence within this group of four parties is particularly relevant as
all of them claim to be both pro-independence and left-wing. They might therefore be
expected to share a certain number of policies or at least priorities; and yet, as will be
demonstrated, the 2016 Scottish Parliament election campaign was defined in a large part
by the policy differences between them.
This  is  because one of  the only unknowns of  the election was the size  of  the SNP's
expected victory and whether the smaller pro-independence parties might manage to
split  the  independence  vote  and  cost  the  SNP  its  overall  majority  in  the  Scottish
Parliament.2
To put the 2016 election into perspective, it is important to understand that the past ten
years  in  Scotland have  been characterised  by  a  series  of  dramatic  ballots  with  very
unexpected  results.  First,  there  was  the  2007 Scottish  Parliament  (or  “Holyrood”)
election, which the SNP won by the tiniest of margins (one seat only) but which made it
into a government party for the first time in its history. This was followed by the 2011
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Holyrood election, when the SNP was the first party to ever win an overall majority of
seats in the Scottish Parliament: not only was this completely unexpected considering the
nature of the electoral system, but it also gave the SNP a political mandate to organise an
independence referendum, something that the party was unprepared for. Then, in 2014,
there was the referendum itself, which was won by the pro-UK, Unionist side, but by a
smaller margin than had originally been expected. And finally, the 2015 British General
Election saw the SNP almost wipe out all  of its competitors,  the three main Unionist
parties (Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats) being left with only one
seat each; although the SNP’s 2015 victory in Scotland was not unexpected, the scale of its
victory was.
This long-term perspective is necessary to understand why the 2016 Holyrood election
campaign was widely felt to be “boring”, with one political commentator complaining that
“[t]he only thing more boring than the 2016 Scottish election” had been “hearing people talk
about how boring” it was.3 An SNP victory was always a given, considering its huge and
consistent lead in the polls, and there were only two unknowns: would the SNP win an
overall majority of seats or a relative one, and might the Conservatives beat Labour into
second place? Linked to the first question was that of the results which the small pro-
independence parties might be able to achieve. As those questions were at the heart of
the campaign, they largely informed the strategies of both the SNP and the smaller pro-
independence parties – which is what this paper will look into first. It will then focus on
three issues which were at the heart of the election campaign and which are major areas
of policy divergence between the SNP on the one hand, and the smaller pro-independence
parties  on  the  other  hand,  namely  income  tax,  fracking  and  the  issue  of  a  second
independence referendum. The underlying aim of this article is to question the existence
of a united independence front in Scotland.
 
The pro-independence parties’ campaign strategies in
the 2016 Holyrood election
On 24 April 2016, just a few weeks before the election, the Sunday Herald ran on its front
page a headline titled “Battle for the second vote of independence supporters”. As one
commentator confirmed just a few days later:
The  most  contentious  topic  of  debate  so  far  has  been  between  supporters  of
independence. And it’s not about policies but about how much the SNP are going to
win by and if there is a tactical benefit for SNP supporters in lending their second
vote to the smaller parties.4
The  2016  Holyrood  election  witnessed  a  striking  convergence  in  the  campaigning
strategies of the smaller pro-independence parties, which, faced with a sure SNP win,
concentrated on attracting people’s second votes. The specific electoral system at work
for Holyrood elections (known as the Additional Member System or the Mixed Member
Proportional System) gives people two votes:  a first one for a constituency candidate
(who, most of the times, represents a political party), and a second one for a regional list
of candidates proposed by a political party. Constituency candidates are elected by the
majoritarian “First  Past  the Post” system,  while regional  candidates are elected by a
proportional system – which is why smaller parties tend to target the second vote. The
battle for second votes became fierce when a report published by political scientist John
Curtice suggested that due to the workings of the electoral system, in which the second
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vote mathematically rebalances the first one, independence supporters might waste their
second vote if they voted for the SNP twice, and might therefore consider lending it to
one of the smaller pro-independence parties instead. The logic was that given the SNP’s
lead on the first vote, the party might not win many seats through the second vote, so
that if one’s priority was to get as many independence supporters elected as possible,
then it might make more sense to use the second vote to try and get Green or socialist
candidates into the Scottish Parliament.
By the time that the report was published, the smaller pro-independence parties had
already chosen to target the second, regional vote. As table 1 shows, the two socialist
parties/alliances, RISE and Solidarity, only stood in the regional lists. As for the Greens,
they presented candidates in every region but only fielded three constituency candidates.
The campaign message of those three smaller parties was adapted to fit this regional
strategy. It was based on two central ideas: that different pro-independence viewpoints
should  be  represented  in  the  Scottish  Parliament,  and  that  Scotland  needed
representatives who could challenge the SNP from the left. Both ideas were encapsulated
in the introduction to the Greens’ manifesto: “Holyrood – and Scotland – needs diverse politics
and  progressive  champions  to  hold  the  biggest  parties  to  account.”5 Similarly,  as  early  as
November 2015 RISE argued that:
The polling has been consistent  for  months:  the SNP will  win another majority
government on the constituency vote alone; voting for the SNP on the second vote
is a wasted vote for indy supporters and will mean less RISE and Green MSPs and
more Labour and Tory MSPs. One of the strengths of the independence movement
was  its  diversity,  now  we  have  a  unique  opportunity  for  that  diversity  to  be
reflected in the Scottish Parliament. (…) It’s for the good of the whole independence
movement if the indyleft voice is part of the debate at Holyrood.6
As for the SNP, its overall strategy, summed up in the hashtag “Both Votes SNP” which
appeared  at  the  bottom  of  every  page  in its  election  manifesto,  mainly  aimed  at
countering the arguments made by the smaller pro-independence parties. Interestingly,
the “Both Votes SNP” slogan had already figured in the SNP’s previous Holyrood election
campaign. On the day before the 2011 election, the then Deputy First Minister Nicola
Sturgeon had stated that:
On the doorstep, online and in the media we will be taking every opportunity to
ensure Scotland’s voters re-elect an SNP Government with both votes. Tomorrow it
has to be both votes SNP for a five-year Council Tax freeze and Alex Salmond for
First Minister.7
At the time, the idea had been to fight any kind of split vote. But in 2016, the “Both Votes
SNP” slogan clearly targeted independence supporters who might be tempted to vote SNP
first and Green or socialist second. This was made abundantly clear in a press article
written  by  rising  SNP star  Mhairi  Black  MP,  in  which she  denounced the  argument
according to which a second vote for one of the smaller pro-independence parties would
be  the  best  way  to  “maximis[e]  the  pro-independence  strength  in  parliament”  as  “wrong,
misguided and – in some cases – profoundly disingenuous”.8 Her words reflect the anger felt by
many SNP sympathisers at the smaller pro-independence parties’ campaign strategy, for
the reasons summed up in the following words by a leading pro-independence journalist:
The SNP has no shortage of  opponents.  Another political party – especially one
born out of the Yes campaign [RISE] – lobbing grenades at it isn’t the best way to
defeat a Unionist movement now on its knees. (…) Weaken the Nats and you always
weaken the independence movement.9
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As explained previously, the smaller pro-independence parties’ campaign strategy was
based on the message that Scotland needed diverse pro-independence voices and that it
needed leftwing challengers to the SNP. The Greens and the socialists therefore had to
demonstrate that their outlook was both different from the SNP’s and more leftwing.
Policy divergence on the independence side was therefore at the heart of the election
campaign.
 
Policy divergence of the pro-independence parties on
the occasion of the 2016 Holyrood election
The two-year-long independence referendum campaign had revealed two major areas of
policy convergence, but also a certain number of big policy differences within the pro-
independence camp which, at the time, had included three parties: the SNP, the Greens
and the Scottish Socialist  Party (SSP).  Although those parties had agreed on two key
issues – independence as well as opposition to nuclear weapons – policy divergence had
been marked in three areas:  defence (they disagreed over an independent Scotland’s
membership of NATO); macro-economic affairs (they disagreed over what currency an
independent  Scotland  might  have);  and  constitutional  affairs  (they  disagreed  over
Scotland remaining a monarchy or becoming a republic). Interestingly, all of those areas
of policy convergence and divergence are reserved matters, not devolved ones. In that
respect, what was particularly interesting about the 2016 Holyrood election is that it gave
air to some of the policy differences between the pro-independence parties in devolved
areas, and not reserved ones, for the first time.
A comparison between the election manifestos of the four main pro-independence parties
allows us to identify the main areas of  policy divergence between them. This  article
focuses on those differences that drew the most media attention and that were therefore
at the heart of the election campaign. Based on this criterion, three policies or policy
areas stand out, namely taxation (this articles takes the example of income tax), fracking
and the issue of a second independence referendum.
In policy terms, taxation was at the heart of the campaign, and it was also the key area
where the pro-independence parties – and in fact all Scottish parties – most diverged. The
most prominent differences were in terms of income tax proposals, which, as noted by
one commentator, is particularly significant as parties’ income tax policies “feed down on
their ability to enact other policies”.10 The pro-independence parties diverged over the issue
of how to use the Scottish Parliament’s new income tax powers, gained as a result of the
Scotland Act 2016. The current UK-wide income tax rates and bands, which the Scottish
Parliament now has the power to vary, are presented in table 2.
 
Table 2: Current British Income Tax rates and bands (2016-17)
Band Taxable income Tax rate
Personal Allowance Up to £11,000 0%
Basic rate £11,000 to £43,000 20% (20p in the £)
Higher rate £43,001 to £150,000 40% (40p in the £)
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Additional rate over £150,000 45% (45p in the £)
Source: https://www.gov.uk/income-tax-rates/current-rates-and-allowances (accessed on 27 May
2016).
The Scotland Act 2012 had already given Holyrood the power to set a Scottish rate of
income tax,  a  power which had only  come into effect  in  April  2016,  just  before the
Holyrood election which this article focuses on. This new power had meant that every tax
year,  10  percentage  points  (or  “10p  in  the  pound”,  in  common  parlance)  would  be
deducted from each of the 3 income tax rates (the basic, higher and additional rates) for
Scottish taxpayers; the Scottish Parliament would then set an annual Scottish rate, which
would lead to Scottish taxpayers paying more, less or as much income tax as English
taxpayers.11 However, the Scotland Act 2012 had not given Holyrood the power to vary
the Scottish rate of income tax by band: the same rate had to be applied equally to all tax
bands. This is one of the major changes brought about by the Scotland Act 2016 (which
received  royal  assent  in  March).  From the  next  tax  year  (i.e.  2017-18),  the  Scottish
Parliament  will  be  able  to  set  both  the  income  tax  rates  and  the  band  thresholds
(excluding the personal allowance, i.e. the amount of non-taxable income).
As could be expected given the Scottish Parliament’s brand new tax powers, income tax
was a major battleground in the 2016 election. Scottish First Minister and SNP leader
Nicola Sturgeon made this quite clear when she noted that the election should not be
taken  lightly,  not  least  because  it  was  “the  first  one  in  which  people  [were] electing  a
government to exercise Scotland’s new tax and welfare powers.”12 Her party made three pledges
concerning income tax. The first was to increase the amount of income exempt from
income tax;  given that the Scottish Parliament does not have the power to vary the
personal allowance, the way in which it proposed to do this was to create a new zero-rate
tax band. The second pledge was to freeze the basic rate of income tax throughout the
next parliament.  The third and most controversial  one was to cancel in Scotland the
British Chancellor’s plans to raise the higher rate threshold from £43,000 to £45,000,13
plans which amount to a tax reduction for some of the highest earning taxpayers. This
pledge was controversial because it was deemed not radical enough: as noted by all the
other left-wing parties in Scotland, cancelling a tax reduction for some of the highest
earners is not the same thing as taxing the rich more,14 and what was notably absent from
the SNP’s manifesto was a pledge to raise the additional tax rate from 45p to 50p. This was
somewhat surprising, as in its 2015 British election manifesto, the SNP had pledged to
back proposals to return the top rate of income tax to 50p UK-wide.15
By contrast,  both the Greens and RISE (Solidarity did not  mention income tax in its
manifesto) proposed to raise the top rate, not from 45p to 50p, but to 60p, which drew
quite a lot of media attention. Simply put, the Greens planned to make those earning less
pay less and those earning more pay more. More precisely, they proposed to change the
three rates of income tax. The basic rate of 20% would be replaced by 2 bands (an 18% and
a 22% band),  which would amount to re-introducing a lower rate of  income tax and
therefore to a tax reduction for low earners. By contrast, the other two rates (the higher
and additional ones) would be increased, respectively from 40% to 43%, and from 45% to
60%.16 As for RISE, it pledged both to raise the additional rate to 60p and to create a new
band covering the top earners amongst the higher rate taxpayers: those earning between
£50,000 and £150,000 per year would be levied at 45p in the pound instead of 40p.17 We see
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that the Greens and RISE both planned to tax the top earners more so as to mitigate the
effect of British government cuts, something that the SNP clearly shied away from.
Policy divergence on tax was used by the smaller pro-independence parties as a central
campaigning plank.  The SNP’s  fiscal  prudence seemed at  odds with its  anti-austerity
rhetoric,  and it  allowed the Greens and RISE to portray themselves  as  the only real
leftwing  pro-independence  alternative  in  Scotland.  How  did  the  SNP  answer  the
accusation that it was not leftwing enough and how did it justify its decision not to raise
the top rate of  income tax? As one SNP candidate put it  during election hustings in
Glasgow, as long as Scotland remains part of the UK, the SNP believes in raising the top
tax rate throughout the UK, but it does not believe in a 50p or 60p tax rate in Scotland
only. The fear is, in the candidate's words, that “money would leave Scotland” (meaning that
the top earners might be tempted to move to another part of the UK), and this was not a
risk that the SNP was ready to take: “when in government”, the SNP candidate added, “we
need to be responsible”.18 The SNP manifesto also explained the decision not to raise the
income tax for the highest earners in the following way: “While the Scottish Government
does not control the rules on income tax avoidance, there is a risk that an increase in the Additional
Rate in Scotland could put revenue at risk.” It was added that the SNP might “consider raising
the additional rate from 45p to 50p from 2018/19 onwards”, but only after conducting a risk
assessment on the issue.19 In summary, the SNP justified its rather conservative stance on
income tax in the name of government responsibility.
Policy divergence between the SNP on the one hand, and the smaller pro-independence
parties on the other hand,  was also obvious over the contentious issue of  “fracking”
(hydraulic fracturing). The Greens, RISE and Solidarity agreed that fracking should be
totally  outlawed  (a  position  also  shared  by  Labour  and  the  Liberal  Democrats).  By
contrast, the SNP’s position was to have a moratorium on fracking while both additional
research and a public consultation on the issue were conducted. The SNP claimed to be “
deeply sceptical about fracking”, and its manifesto committed it to a policy of no fracking
unless “it [could] be proven beyond any doubt that there is no risk to health, communities or the
environment”.20 The SNP also argued that a moratorium was better than a ban, as a ban
could be challenged in court by the big fracking companies. However that may be, the
SNP’s position on fracking was less straightforward (and more worrying in the eyes of
anti-fracking activists) than that of the other parties. This was confirmed on 1 June 2016,
when the party abstained in the Scottish Parliament on a motion which called for “an
outright ban on fracking”.21 However, the motion was carried despite the SNP’s abstention,
which increases the pressure on the SNP to support a total ban.
Finally,  on  the  issue  of  a  second  independence  referendum  (or  “indyref”,  as  it  is
commonly known in Scotland), the 2016 election saw the convergence of the two socialist
groupings, on the one hand, and of the Greens and the SNP on the other hand. RISE and
Solidarity both made the holding of  a second independence referendum one of  their
utmost priorities, and they both argued for it to take place in the course of the next
parliament. RISE pledged to table a resolution on the Scottish Parliament's “right to a
mandate to call for and achieve a second referendum on independence, at the time of its choosing,
during the lifetime of this Parliament”,22 and Solidarity to introduce a Private Member’s Bill
calling for a referendum to be held in 2018.23 Both political groupings insisted on the
importance of Scotland having a mandate to call for a second referendum, but while RISE
explained how Scotland might  gain such a  mandate,  Solidarity  argued that  Scotland
already had one, because the previous independence referendum had been rigged24 and
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because the pro-independence SNP had then gone on to win almost all Scottish seats in
the 2015 UK General Election. By contrast, the SNP and the Greens refused to make a
priority of the issue of a second independence referendum – to the point that it did not
even figure on the two-page-long list of SNP priorities at the beginning of its manifesto.
Neither party committed to asking for the holding of another referendum in the course of
the next parliament. As Nicola Sturgeon declared at the launch of her party’s manifesto, “
setting the date for a referendum before a majority of the Scottish people have been persuaded that
independence – and therefore another referendum – is the best future for our country is the wrong
way round”.25 Moreover, both the SNP and the Greens insisted that it was for the people of
Scotland to decide when a second referendum should be held. However, both remained
deliberately vague on the issue of what might constitute a popular mandate for a second
independence referendum. The SNP spoke of the need for “clear and sustained evidence that
independence has become the preferred option of a majority of the Scottish people”,26 and the
Greens of a petition presented in parliament and signed by “an appropriate number of
people”27 (though  admittedly,  their  website  did  give  a  precise  figure  of  one  million
signatures). The only real difference between the positions of the Greens and the SNP on
a second independence referendum was that the SNP identified two possible routes to a
second “indyref”: not just a popular mandate, but also what it called “a significant and
material change in the circumstances that prevailed in 2014, such as Scotland being taken out of
the EU against our will”28 – a phrase which has been at the centre of debates since the 2016
EU membership referendum, when Scotland voted very clearly to remain in the EU while
the UK as a whole voted to leave it.
 
Conclusion
The underlying aim of this article has been to examine to what extent the Scottish pro-
independence parties  concur beyond their  convergence on the general  policy aim of
independence. The Scottish independence referendum campaign seemed to have given
birth to a united independence front in Scotland, all the more so since all of the pro-
independence parties had claimed to belong to the wider left movement. The campaign
had also revealed crucial policy and ideological differences on the pro-independence side
over  the  currency,  NATO  and  the  monarchy.  However,  at  the  time,  independence
supporters had downplayed their differences and attempted to present a united front
behind the  common goal  of  independence,  arguing  that  divisive  questions  would  be
settled democratically after that goal had been attained. They had also insisted on their
overall ideological convergence or at least compatibility, due to their common support
for independence, but also to their common opposition to austerity politics and support
for greater social justice.  The return to electoral politics on the occasion of the 2015
British General Election could have led to cracks appearing in the independence front; in
the event it did not,29 as there was hardly any competition on the pro-independence side:
the  SSP  only  fielded  four  candidates  and  the  Greens  competed  in  about  half  of  the
Scottish constituencies, meaning that dissensions between the pro-independence parties
were once again largely hidden from view. The 2016 Scottish Parliament election was
therefore the first post-referendum election to bring those dissensions to the fore. What
is more, it was the first time that policy divergence in devolved matters and not just in
reserved  ones  became  an  issue.  This  policy  divergence  fed  into  the  smaller  parties’
electoral strategy and led to a bitter battle of words between independence supporters.
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In the wake of the 2016 election, many SNP supporters were very angry at the smaller
pro-independence parties,  which they blamed for  the SNP losing its  overall  majority
(which it had had since 2011). However, the election results on the pro-independence side
(which are presented in table 3) must be put into perspective.
 








TOTAL  winning  candidates  (out
of 129)
SNP 59 (+6) 4 (-12) 63 (-6)
Scottish Greens 0 6 (+4) 6 (+4)
RISE :  Scotland's  Left
Alliance
0 0 0
Solidarity 0 0 0
Scottish Libertarians 0 0 0
First,  the  SNP  is  just  two  MSPs-short  of  an  overall  majority.  Second,  the  pro-
independence side still  has a total  majority in parliament (with 69 seats out of  129).
Thirdly, and finally, the risk that the SNP might be regularly challenged from the left by a
significant group of Green and socialist MSPs has largely been averted. Arguably, the
considerable rise of the Conservatives (who went from 15 to 31 seats, thereby becoming
the main opposition party in Holyrood for the first time in the history of the Parliament)
is a more significant result for the SNP than the rise of the Greens. One political scientist
had speculated during the election campaign that “the Greens and Rise  [would be] the
biggest  critics  of  the SNP by far” and that “the SNP would rather  have more Conservatives
because  they  will  push  for  tax  reduction  and  then  the  SNP  can  look  socially  democratic  by
comparison”.30 As this article has hopefully illustrated, in its 2016 electoral campaign, the
SNP targeted the middle ground more than the left, and it sought to present itself as a
“responsible” party by contrast with the smaller pro-independence parties.
In the end, the fact that the 2016 Scottish Parliament election fissured what was always a
superficially  united  pro-independence  front  in  Scotland  could  be  one  of  its  most
significant legacies. The “vehemence with which a hardline minority of SNP supporters have
opposed the smaller parties like the Greens”,31 a vehemence that was tangible in the days that
followed the election in the readers’ letters published in the National (an independence-
supporting Scottish daily paper), makes it very doubtful whether the façade of a united
independence front could be kept in the event of a second independence referendum in
the near future.
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NOTES
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manifesto,  People,  Planet,  Peace,  p. 10).  Until  then,  it  had  supported  greater  devolution  and
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4. Gordon MacIntyre-Kemp, ibid.
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Newsnet  Scotland,  14  January  2016,  http://newsnet.scot/citizen/battle-list-vote-backing-rise-
wont-help-independence/.
10. Jenni  Davidson,  “Scottish Parliament Election 2016:  Manifestos  and Manifesto  Launches”,
Holyrood, 25 April 2016.
11. When that power came into effect, in April 2016, the Scottish Parliament decided on a 10%
Scottish rate, so that Scottish taxpayers would pay exactly the same amount as English taxpayers.
12. See Nicola Sturgeon, “My Pitch to the Scottish People”, The Herald, 17 April 2016.
13. To be precise, the plan was to freeze in Scotland the higher rate threshold in real terms and
have it increase only in line with inflation.
14. See for instance the Scottish Greens, “7 ways the Greens’ tax plans will make Scotland fairer”,
29 March 2016, https://greens.scot/blog/7-ways-the-greens-tax-plan-will-make-scotland-fairer:
“It isn’t good enough to say Scotland won’t implement Osborne’s tax giveaway to the richest. Scotland can
be better. (…) [O]nly by raising money fairly can we protect the public services we all need.”
15. SNP, 2015 Westminster Election manifesto, Stronger for Scotland, p. 8 and p. 14.
16. Scottish Greens, 2016 Scottish Parliament manifesto, op. cit., p. 26.
17. RISE, 2016 Scottish Parliament manifesto, Another Scotland is Possible, p. 5.
18. Scottish Parliament election hustings attended by the author, Glasgow Kelvin constituency,
St Mary’s Cathedral, 27 April 2016.
19. See SNP, 2016 Scottish Parliament manifesto, Re-elect Nicola Sturgeon, p. 17.
20. Ibid., p. 31.
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21. SNP motion S5M-00226.4 on “Taking Scotland forward – Environment, Climate Change and
Land Reform” as amended by a Labour amendment, debated in the Scottish Parliament on 1 June
2016.
22. RISE, 2016 Scottish Parliament manifesto, op. cit., p. 7.
23. Solidarity, 2016 Scottish Parliament manifesto, https://solidarity.scot/solidarity-manifesto-
holyrood-election-5th-may-2016/.
24. Solidarity’s manifesto argued that as the people of Scotland had been “subjected to a tsunami of
lies, bullying, distortions and dangerously biased media reporting”. See ibid..
25. See for instance Kathleen Nut, “Sturgeon Confident on Turning No votes”, The National, 21
April 2016.
26. SNP, 2016 Scottish Parliament manifesto, op. cit., p. 23.
27. Scottish Greens, 2016 Scottish Parliament manifesto, op. cit., p. 37.
28. SNP, 2016 Scottish Parliament manifesto, op. cit., p. 23.
29. Even though there were no united “Yes” candidates,  as  the SSP had wished for.  See for
instance  https://www.scottishsocialistparty.org/ssp-announces-party-will-stand-
candidates-2015-general-election/.
30. Paul Cairney, quoted in Peter Swindon, “Battle under Way for Independence Supporters’ List
Vote at Holyrood”, Sunday Herald, 24 April 2016.
31. Sunday Herald, “What we Want from the Next Scottish Parliament”, Sunday Herald,  1 May
2016.
ABSTRACTS
This article examines policy divergence between the main pro-independence parties in Scotland
(the Scottish National Party, the Scottish Greens, and two socialist parties/alliances: RISE and
Solidarity) in the context of the 2016 Scottish Parliament election. Even though those parties are
all  pro-independence and leftwing,  the election campaign was defined in a large part by the
policy differences between them, as one of the only unknowns of the election was the scale of the
SNP's expected victory and whether the smaller pro-independence parties might cost the SNP its
overall parliamentary majority. The article analyses the campaign strategy of the smaller pro-
independence parties  and the SNP's  reaction to this  strategy.  It  then looks into three issues
which were at the heart of the election campaign and which are major areas of policy divergence
between the SNP on the one hand, and the smaller pro-independence parties on the other hand,
namely income tax, fracking and the issue of a second independence referendum. The underlying
aim of the article is to examine to what extent the Scottish pro-independence parties concur
beyond  their  convergence  on  the  general  policy  aim  of  independence,  and  to  question  the
existence of a united independence front in Scotland.
Cet  article  étudie  les  divergences  programmatiques  des  principaux  partis  indépendantistes
écossais (le Scottish National Party, les Verts écossais, et deux partis/alliances socialistes: RISE et
Solidarity) dans le cadre des élections législatives écossaises de 2016. Bien que ces partis soient
tous indépendantistes et de gauche, la campagne électorale a été en grande partie définie par les
différences  programmatiques  entre  eux,  car  l'une  des  seules  inconnues  des  élections  était
l'ampleur  de  la  victoire  annoncée  du SNP et  si  les  petits  partis  indépendantistes  pourraient
priver le SNP de sa majorité absolue au Parlement écossais. Cet article analyse la stratégie de
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campagne  des  petits  partis  indépendantistes  et  la  réaction  du  SNP  à  cette  stratégie.  Il  se
concentre ensuite sur trois questions qui furent au cœur de la campagne et sur lesquelles les
programmes  du  SNP  et  des  petits  partis  indépendantistes  divergent,  à  savoir  l'impôt  sur  le
revenu, la fracturation hydraulique, et la question d'un second référendum sur l'indépendance
écossaise.  L'objectif  sous-jacent  de  cet  article  est  de  déterminer  dans  quelle  mesure  il  y  a
convergence entre les différents partis indépendantistes écossais au-delà de la question générale
de l'indépendance, et d'interroger l'existence d'un front indépendantiste uni en Écosse.
INDEX
Mots-clés: élections législatives écossaises, partis politiques; indépendance écossaise
Keywords: Scottish Parliament election, political parties, Scottish independence
AUTHOR
NATHALIE DUCLOS
CAS (EA801), Université de Toulouse-Jean Jaurès
A United Independence Front? Policy Divergence between the Scottish Pro-indep...
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXII-4 | 2017
13
